Categoria
TLS e trasporto
Tutti gli strumenti e gli articoli di questa categoria, riuniti in un unico posto.
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Articoli
Anatomia di una suite di cifratura TLS
Cosa nomina davvero una suite di cifratura TLS, come leggere una suite come TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 pezzo per pezzo, e come lo stesso punto di codice di due byte compare sotto tre convenzioni di nomi diverse.
LeggiLeggere i nomi delle suite di cifratura: IANA, OpenSSL e GnuTLS
Perché la stessa suite di cifratura ha tre nomi diversi e un punto di codice di due byte, come tradurre tra le convenzioni di IANA, OpenSSL e GnuTLS, e cosa significa davvero la colonna Recommended della IANA con Y, N e D.
LeggiAEAD contro CBC: perché la modalità conta
La differenza pratica tra un cifrario AEAD come AES-GCM e un vecchio cifrario CBC con un HMAC separato, gli attacchi padding oracle che hanno eliminato il MAC-then-encrypt, e l'unico compromesso che AEAD chiede ancora.
LeggiLa forward secrecy e lo scambio di chiavi
Cosa offre la forward secrecy, perché il trasporto di chiave RSA statico non la fornisce, come la forniscono ECDHE e DHE, e perché autenticazione e scambio di chiavi sono due compiti distinti che il nome di una suite tiene separati.
LeggiSuite di cifratura di TLS 1.3: cosa è cambiato
Perché una suite TLS 1.3 nomina solo un cifrario e un hash, dove sono finiti lo scambio di chiavi e l'autenticazione, e perché l'elenco delle suite si è ridotto da centinaia a una manciata.
LeggiWhat a Quantum Computer Would Break, and What It Would Not
A large quantum computer would not weaken all cryptography equally. Shor's algorithm breaks the public-key math behind RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curves outright; Grover's algorithm only halves the strength of symmetric ciphers and hashes, which AES-256 and SHA-384 already survive. This explains the split, why 'harvest now, decrypt later' makes it a today problem, and why a broken candidate like SIKE is a reminder to stay humble.
LeggiThe NIST Post-Quantum Standards: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA
In August 2024 NIST finalized the first three post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, from Kyber) for key establishment, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, from Dilithium) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, from SPHINCS+) for signatures. This explains what each one is for, why there are two signature standards on different math, and where HQC and FN-DSA fit as the backups still coming down the pipeline.
LeggiHybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3: What X25519MLKEM768 Does on the Wire
The web did not swap classical key exchange for post-quantum; it runs both at once. X25519MLKEM768 combines a 1990s elliptic curve with lattice-based ML-KEM-768 in a single TLS 1.3 group, so a break of either still leaves the session secure. This covers why hybrid rather than replacement, the wire format and its size problem, and where deployment stands across browsers, servers, and the middleboxes it breaks.
LeggiInbound TLS: Offload, Bridging, and Passthrough at the Reverse Proxy
A reverse proxy handling inbound HTTPS has three choices for the TLS session: terminate it and send plaintext to the backend (offload), terminate and re-encrypt to the backend (bridging), or forward the encrypted bytes untouched (passthrough). Each trades visibility against confidentiality and cost differently. This explains all three, why the proxy holds the server's certificate, and what SNI and mutual TLS change.
LeggiTLS 1.2 vs TLS 1.3 vs DTLS vs QUIC: One Handshake Family, Four Shapes
TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 secure a TCP stream, DTLS carries the same guarantees over datagrams, and QUIC absorbs the TLS 1.3 handshake into the transport itself. What each one is, which RFC defines it today, what actually changed between them, and where each one runs.
LeggiWhat Is a JA4 TLS Fingerprint?
How a TLS ClientHello becomes a stable fingerprint of the client software, why JA3 faded once browsers began randomizing extension order, how JA4 fixes that by sorting before hashing, and what JA4 can and cannot tell you.
LeggiWhy Do We Say SSL When We Mean TLS?
SSL has been prohibited, deprecated, and dead for years - and the industry still sells 'SSL certificates,' configures 'SSL inspection,' and links openssl. The history explains the habit: Netscape's SSL, the political rename to TLS in 1999 (the wire version field still said 3.1), and a quarter century of marketing inertia. Plus the musing the question deserves: what would a protocol-independent name even look like, and do any exist?
Leggi