Categoría
TLS y transporte
Todas las herramientas y artículos de esta categoría, reunidos en un solo lugar.
Herramientas
Artículos
Anatomía de una suite de cifrado TLS
Qué nombra en realidad una suite de cifrado TLS, cómo leer una suite como TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 parte por parte, y cómo el mismo punto de código de dos bytes aparece bajo tres convenciones de nombres diferentes.
LeerLeer nombres de suites de cifrado: IANA, OpenSSL y GnuTLS
Por qué la misma suite de cifrado tiene tres nombres distintos y un punto de código de dos bytes, cómo traducir entre las convenciones de la IANA, OpenSSL y GnuTLS, y qué significa en realidad la columna Recommended de la IANA con Y, N y D.
LeerAEAD frente a CBC: por qué importa el modo
La diferencia práctica entre un cifrado AEAD como AES-GCM y un cifrado CBC más antiguo con un HMAC aparte, los ataques de oráculo de relleno que acabaron con el MAC-then-encrypt, y la única concesión que AEAD sigue pidiendo.
LeerConfidencialidad futura y el intercambio de claves
Qué aporta la confidencialidad futura, por qué el transporte de clave RSA estático no la ofrece, cómo lo hacen ECDHE y DHE, y por qué la autenticación y el intercambio de claves son dos tareas distintas que el nombre de una suite mantiene separadas.
LeerSuites de cifrado de TLS 1.3: qué cambió
Por qué una suite de TLS 1.3 nombra solo un cifrado y un hash, adónde fueron el intercambio de claves y la autenticación, y por qué la lista de suites se redujo de cientos a un puñado.
LeerWhat a Quantum Computer Would Break, and What It Would Not
A large quantum computer would not weaken all cryptography equally. Shor's algorithm breaks the public-key math behind RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curves outright; Grover's algorithm only halves the strength of symmetric ciphers and hashes, which AES-256 and SHA-384 already survive. This explains the split, why 'harvest now, decrypt later' makes it a today problem, and why a broken candidate like SIKE is a reminder to stay humble.
LeerThe NIST Post-Quantum Standards: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA
In August 2024 NIST finalized the first three post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, from Kyber) for key establishment, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, from Dilithium) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, from SPHINCS+) for signatures. This explains what each one is for, why there are two signature standards on different math, and where HQC and FN-DSA fit as the backups still coming down the pipeline.
LeerHybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3: What X25519MLKEM768 Does on the Wire
The web did not swap classical key exchange for post-quantum; it runs both at once. X25519MLKEM768 combines a 1990s elliptic curve with lattice-based ML-KEM-768 in a single TLS 1.3 group, so a break of either still leaves the session secure. This covers why hybrid rather than replacement, the wire format and its size problem, and where deployment stands across browsers, servers, and the middleboxes it breaks.
LeerInbound TLS: Offload, Bridging, and Passthrough at the Reverse Proxy
A reverse proxy handling inbound HTTPS has three choices for the TLS session: terminate it and send plaintext to the backend (offload), terminate and re-encrypt to the backend (bridging), or forward the encrypted bytes untouched (passthrough). Each trades visibility against confidentiality and cost differently. This explains all three, why the proxy holds the server's certificate, and what SNI and mutual TLS change.
LeerTLS 1.2 vs TLS 1.3 vs DTLS vs QUIC: One Handshake Family, Four Shapes
TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 secure a TCP stream, DTLS carries the same guarantees over datagrams, and QUIC absorbs the TLS 1.3 handshake into the transport itself. What each one is, which RFC defines it today, what actually changed between them, and where each one runs.
LeerWhat Is a JA4 TLS Fingerprint?
How a TLS ClientHello becomes a stable fingerprint of the client software, why JA3 faded once browsers began randomizing extension order, how JA4 fixes that by sorting before hashing, and what JA4 can and cannot tell you.
LeerWhy Do We Say SSL When We Mean TLS?
SSL has been prohibited, deprecated, and dead for years - and the industry still sells 'SSL certificates,' configures 'SSL inspection,' and links openssl. The history explains the habit: Netscape's SSL, the political rename to TLS in 1999 (the wire version field still said 3.1), and a quarter century of marketing inertia. Plus the musing the question deserves: what would a protocol-independent name even look like, and do any exist?
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