All vendors

Vendor lineage

CrowdStrike

Built on the argument that you should hunt the attacker rather than the malware - then proved, in one morning, what a lightweight agent everywhere really means.

CrowdStrike was incorporated on 7 November 2011 by George Kurtz, Dmitri Alperovitch and Gregg Marston. Kurtz had been chief technology officer at McAfee, having sold it his previous company, Foundstone, in 2004. He resigned, spent a spell as an entrepreneur in residence at Warburg Pincus, and left with a $26M cheque from them to build the thing he thought McAfee could not.

The founding argument was specific rather than promotional. Signature-based antivirus asks 'have I seen this file before', which is answerable only about attacks that have already happened somewhere else, and the scanning it requires is heavy enough that users disable it. Alperovitch had attributed the 2009 Operation Aurora intrusions to Chinese actors while at McAfee, and the lesson both founders took was that the interesting question is not which malware is present but which adversary is operating - and adversaries reuse behaviour even when they change their tools.

So Falcon, shipped in 2013, inverted the model: a deliberately light agent that streams telemetry to a cloud where behaviour is correlated across every customer at once. One organisation seeing something odd becomes every organisation knowing about it. That is a genuinely different product from an on-premises scanner, and it is why the company grew as fast as it did.

The investigations made the name. Sony Pictures in 2014, the Democratic National Committee intrusions in 2015 and 2016 - work that put a private company in the middle of a national political argument, which is a position security vendors had not previously occupied.

It went public in June 2019 at roughly $14B, rose over 70% on the first day, and joined the S&P 500 in 2024.

Then, on 19 July 2024 at 04:09 UTC, a faulty configuration update to the Falcon sensor crashed an estimated 8.5 million Windows machines and left them unable to restart. Airlines, hospitals, banks, broadcasters and payment terminals stopped. It is generally described as the largest IT outage in history, with damage estimated near $10B, and it produced duelling lawsuits between CrowdStrike and Delta Air Lines.

The uncomfortable part is that the outage was not a failure of the architecture so much as its logical conclusion. A lightweight agent with kernel access on millions of machines, updated centrally and rapidly, is exactly what made the detection model work - and exactly what made one bad file global before anyone could intervene. Every property that made the product good made the failure big. That trade is worth understanding before deploying anything shaped the same way, which is most of modern security.