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TLS und Transport
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Anatomie einer TLS-Cipher-Suite
Was eine TLS-Cipher-Suite tatsächlich benennt, wie man eine Suite wie TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Stück für Stück liest und wie derselbe Zwei-Byte-Codepunkt unter drei verschiedenen Namenskonventionen erscheint.
LesenCipher-Suite-Namen lesen: IANA, OpenSSL und GnuTLS
Warum dieselbe Cipher-Suite drei verschiedene Namen und einen Zwei-Byte-Codepunkt hat, wie man zwischen den Konventionen von IANA, OpenSSL und GnuTLS übersetzt und was die Recommended-Spalte der IANA mit Y, N und D wirklich bedeutet.
LesenAEAD gegen CBC: Warum der Modus zählt
Der praktische Unterschied zwischen einer AEAD-Chiffre wie AES-GCM und einer älteren CBC-Chiffre mit separatem HMAC, die Padding-Oracle-Angriffe, die MAC-then-encrypt erledigten, und der eine Kompromiss, den AEAD weiterhin verlangt.
LesenForward Secrecy und der Schlüsselaustausch
Was Forward Secrecy bringt, warum statischer RSA-Schlüsseltransport sie nicht bietet, wie ECDHE und DHE es tun und warum Authentifizierung und Schlüsselaustausch zwei getrennte Aufgaben sind, die der Name einer Suite getrennt hält.
LesenTLS-1.3-Cipher-Suites: Was sich geändert hat
Warum eine TLS-1.3-Suite nur eine Chiffre und einen Hash benennt, wohin Schlüsselaustausch und Authentifizierung gewandert sind und warum die Liste der Suiten von Hunderten auf eine Handvoll geschrumpft ist.
LesenWhat a Quantum Computer Would Break, and What It Would Not
A large quantum computer would not weaken all cryptography equally. Shor's algorithm breaks the public-key math behind RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curves outright; Grover's algorithm only halves the strength of symmetric ciphers and hashes, which AES-256 and SHA-384 already survive. This explains the split, why 'harvest now, decrypt later' makes it a today problem, and why a broken candidate like SIKE is a reminder to stay humble.
LesenThe NIST Post-Quantum Standards: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA
In August 2024 NIST finalized the first three post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, from Kyber) for key establishment, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, from Dilithium) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, from SPHINCS+) for signatures. This explains what each one is for, why there are two signature standards on different math, and where HQC and FN-DSA fit as the backups still coming down the pipeline.
LesenHybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3: What X25519MLKEM768 Does on the Wire
The web did not swap classical key exchange for post-quantum; it runs both at once. X25519MLKEM768 combines a 1990s elliptic curve with lattice-based ML-KEM-768 in a single TLS 1.3 group, so a break of either still leaves the session secure. This covers why hybrid rather than replacement, the wire format and its size problem, and where deployment stands across browsers, servers, and the middleboxes it breaks.
LesenInbound TLS: Offload, Bridging, and Passthrough at the Reverse Proxy
A reverse proxy handling inbound HTTPS has three choices for the TLS session: terminate it and send plaintext to the backend (offload), terminate and re-encrypt to the backend (bridging), or forward the encrypted bytes untouched (passthrough). Each trades visibility against confidentiality and cost differently. This explains all three, why the proxy holds the server's certificate, and what SNI and mutual TLS change.
LesenTLS 1.2 vs TLS 1.3 vs DTLS vs QUIC: One Handshake Family, Four Shapes
TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 secure a TCP stream, DTLS carries the same guarantees over datagrams, and QUIC absorbs the TLS 1.3 handshake into the transport itself. What each one is, which RFC defines it today, what actually changed between them, and where each one runs.
LesenWhat Is a JA4 TLS Fingerprint?
How a TLS ClientHello becomes a stable fingerprint of the client software, why JA3 faded once browsers began randomizing extension order, how JA4 fixes that by sorting before hashing, and what JA4 can and cannot tell you.
LesenWhy Do We Say SSL When We Mean TLS?
SSL has been prohibited, deprecated, and dead for years - and the industry still sells 'SSL certificates,' configures 'SSL inspection,' and links openssl. The history explains the habit: Netscape's SSL, the political rename to TLS in 1999 (the wire version field still said 3.1), and a quarter century of marketing inertia. Plus the musing the question deserves: what would a protocol-independent name even look like, and do any exist?
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