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TLS og transport
Alle værktøjer og artikler i denne kategori, samlet ét sted.
Værktøjer
Artikler
Anatomien i en TLS-ciphersuite
Hvad en TLS-ciphersuite faktisk navngiver, hvordan man læser en suite som TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 del for del, og hvordan det samme kodepunkt på to byte optræder under tre forskellige navnekonventioner.
LæsAt læse ciphersuite-navne: IANA, OpenSSL og GnuTLS
Hvorfor den samme ciphersuite har tre forskellige navne og et kodepunkt på to byte, hvordan man oversætter mellem IANA-, OpenSSL- og GnuTLS-konventionerne, og hvad IANA's Recommended-kolonne med Y, N og D virkelig betyder.
LæsAEAD over for CBC: hvorfor tilstanden betyder noget
Den praktiske forskel mellem et AEAD-cipher som AES-GCM og et ældre CBC-cipher med en separat HMAC, padding-orakel-angrebene der gjorde det af med MAC-then-encrypt, og det ene kompromis, som AEAD stadig beder om.
LæsForward secrecy og nøgleudvekslingen
Hvad forward secrecy giver, hvorfor statisk RSA-nøgletransport ikke tilbyder det, hvordan ECDHE og DHE gør, og hvorfor autentificering og nøgleudveksling er to adskilte opgaver, som en suites navn holder adskilt.
LæsTLS 1.3-ciphersuiter: hvad der ændrede sig
Hvorfor en TLS 1.3-suite kun navngiver et cipher og en hash, hvor nøgleudvekslingen og autentificeringen blev af, og hvorfor listen over suiter skrumpede fra hundreder til en håndfuld.
LæsWhat a Quantum Computer Would Break, and What It Would Not
A large quantum computer would not weaken all cryptography equally. Shor's algorithm breaks the public-key math behind RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curves outright; Grover's algorithm only halves the strength of symmetric ciphers and hashes, which AES-256 and SHA-384 already survive. This explains the split, why 'harvest now, decrypt later' makes it a today problem, and why a broken candidate like SIKE is a reminder to stay humble.
LæsThe NIST Post-Quantum Standards: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA
In August 2024 NIST finalized the first three post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, from Kyber) for key establishment, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, from Dilithium) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, from SPHINCS+) for signatures. This explains what each one is for, why there are two signature standards on different math, and where HQC and FN-DSA fit as the backups still coming down the pipeline.
LæsHybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3: What X25519MLKEM768 Does on the Wire
The web did not swap classical key exchange for post-quantum; it runs both at once. X25519MLKEM768 combines a 1990s elliptic curve with lattice-based ML-KEM-768 in a single TLS 1.3 group, so a break of either still leaves the session secure. This covers why hybrid rather than replacement, the wire format and its size problem, and where deployment stands across browsers, servers, and the middleboxes it breaks.
LæsInbound TLS: Offload, Bridging, and Passthrough at the Reverse Proxy
A reverse proxy handling inbound HTTPS has three choices for the TLS session: terminate it and send plaintext to the backend (offload), terminate and re-encrypt to the backend (bridging), or forward the encrypted bytes untouched (passthrough). Each trades visibility against confidentiality and cost differently. This explains all three, why the proxy holds the server's certificate, and what SNI and mutual TLS change.
LæsTLS 1.2 vs TLS 1.3 vs DTLS vs QUIC: One Handshake Family, Four Shapes
TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 secure a TCP stream, DTLS carries the same guarantees over datagrams, and QUIC absorbs the TLS 1.3 handshake into the transport itself. What each one is, which RFC defines it today, what actually changed between them, and where each one runs.
LæsWhat Is a JA4 TLS Fingerprint?
How a TLS ClientHello becomes a stable fingerprint of the client software, why JA3 faded once browsers began randomizing extension order, how JA4 fixes that by sorting before hashing, and what JA4 can and cannot tell you.
LæsWhy Do We Say SSL When We Mean TLS?
SSL has been prohibited, deprecated, and dead for years - and the industry still sells 'SSL certificates,' configures 'SSL inspection,' and links openssl. The history explains the habit: Netscape's SSL, the political rename to TLS in 1999 (the wire version field still said 3.1), and a quarter century of marketing inertia. Plus the musing the question deserves: what would a protocol-independent name even look like, and do any exist?
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