Kategori
TLS og transport
Alle verktøy og artikler i denne kategorien, samlet på ett sted.
Verktøy
Artikler
Anatomien til en TLS-chiffersuite
Hva en TLS-chiffersuite faktisk navngir, hvordan man leser en suite som TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 del for del, og hvordan det samme kodepunktet på to byte dukker opp under tre ulike navnekonvensjoner.
LesÅ lese chiffersuitenavn: IANA, OpenSSL og GnuTLS
Hvorfor den samme chiffersuiten har tre forskjellige navn og et kodepunkt på to byte, hvordan man oversetter mellom IANA-, OpenSSL- og GnuTLS-konvensjonene, og hva IANAs Recommended-kolonne med Y, N og D virkelig betyr.
LesAEAD mot CBC: hvorfor modusen betyr noe
Den praktiske forskjellen mellom et AEAD-chiffer som AES-GCM og et eldre CBC-chiffer med en separat HMAC, padding-orakel-angrepene som tok knekken på MAC-then-encrypt, og det ene kompromisset AEAD fremdeles ber om.
LesForward secrecy og nøkkelutvekslingen
Hva forward secrecy gir, hvorfor statisk RSA-nøkkeltransport ikke tilbyr det, hvordan ECDHE og DHE gjør det, og hvorfor autentisering og nøkkelutveksling er to atskilte oppgaver som en suites navn holder fra hverandre.
LesTLS 1.3-chiffersuiter: hva som endret seg
Hvorfor en TLS 1.3-suite bare navngir ett chiffer og én hash, hvor nøkkelutvekslingen og autentiseringen ble av, og hvorfor listen over suiter krympet fra hundrevis til en håndfull.
LesWhat a Quantum Computer Would Break, and What It Would Not
A large quantum computer would not weaken all cryptography equally. Shor's algorithm breaks the public-key math behind RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curves outright; Grover's algorithm only halves the strength of symmetric ciphers and hashes, which AES-256 and SHA-384 already survive. This explains the split, why 'harvest now, decrypt later' makes it a today problem, and why a broken candidate like SIKE is a reminder to stay humble.
LesThe NIST Post-Quantum Standards: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA
In August 2024 NIST finalized the first three post-quantum standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, from Kyber) for key establishment, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, from Dilithium) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, from SPHINCS+) for signatures. This explains what each one is for, why there are two signature standards on different math, and where HQC and FN-DSA fit as the backups still coming down the pipeline.
LesHybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3: What X25519MLKEM768 Does on the Wire
The web did not swap classical key exchange for post-quantum; it runs both at once. X25519MLKEM768 combines a 1990s elliptic curve with lattice-based ML-KEM-768 in a single TLS 1.3 group, so a break of either still leaves the session secure. This covers why hybrid rather than replacement, the wire format and its size problem, and where deployment stands across browsers, servers, and the middleboxes it breaks.
LesInbound TLS: Offload, Bridging, and Passthrough at the Reverse Proxy
A reverse proxy handling inbound HTTPS has three choices for the TLS session: terminate it and send plaintext to the backend (offload), terminate and re-encrypt to the backend (bridging), or forward the encrypted bytes untouched (passthrough). Each trades visibility against confidentiality and cost differently. This explains all three, why the proxy holds the server's certificate, and what SNI and mutual TLS change.
LesTLS 1.2 vs TLS 1.3 vs DTLS vs QUIC: One Handshake Family, Four Shapes
TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 secure a TCP stream, DTLS carries the same guarantees over datagrams, and QUIC absorbs the TLS 1.3 handshake into the transport itself. What each one is, which RFC defines it today, what actually changed between them, and where each one runs.
LesWhat Is a JA4 TLS Fingerprint?
How a TLS ClientHello becomes a stable fingerprint of the client software, why JA3 faded once browsers began randomizing extension order, how JA4 fixes that by sorting before hashing, and what JA4 can and cannot tell you.
LesWhy Do We Say SSL When We Mean TLS?
SSL has been prohibited, deprecated, and dead for years - and the industry still sells 'SSL certificates,' configures 'SSL inspection,' and links openssl. The history explains the habit: Netscape's SSL, the political rename to TLS in 1999 (the wire version field still said 3.1), and a quarter century of marketing inertia. Plus the musing the question deserves: what would a protocol-independent name even look like, and do any exist?
Les